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4
!e Right and the Wren
Christa Peterson and Jack Samuel
A human being becomes human only among others.
Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right
4.1 Being human
We and other animals live in worlds richly colored by a!ect. A little wren 
has likes and dislikes, desires and aversions guiding it through the world. It 
does not know much of other minds, and so these attitudes presumably do 
not appear, to the wren, as personal, as signi"cances things have only to it. 
#ey illuminate its world, and it follows where they lead.
Our own relationship to our desires is somewhat di!erent. We under-
stand our desires as our own; other people, we know, have di!erent ones. 
But the world through our human eyes seems to come to light with a!ective 
and directive meaning far beyond whatever personal desires and prefer-
ences happened to show up in our bellies. #ings are colored not just—or 
even primarily—as wanted and unwanted by us, but as good and bad. We 
may act on a natural desire, but between the pull and the action there’s 
something more, something that gives us space to go in a direction other 
than wherever we’d be carried by our immediate inclinations: Is it truly 
good? Is it actually bad?
Ours is a valuer’s world. And it’s a shared world. We talk together of 
what’s good and bad. Our world seems colored by other people’s a!ect, not 
just our own. #e grip of their pain seems immediate, not needing to be 
routed through any of our personal interests—as bad, as an urgent, pressing 
reason for us, just in virtue of our being there to see it, in the way we, as 
another person, can.
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We will argue that these things are connected: that by coming to see 
 others in a particular way, we gain a new evaluative capacity, one essential 
for our ability to take re9ective distance from our own desires and set our 
own ends. #e view we’ll propose will be a kind of constructivism, in that it 
will portray moral reasons as arising from our very capacity to recognize 
ourselves as having reasons, but one in which that capacity itself is essen-
tially social: it can develop only together with others, and, once developed, 
demands responsiveness to their perspectives.
In metaethics we o:en lose sight of the fact that what’s at stake isn’t just 
the status of moral verdicts, but the meaning and gravity of morally relevant 
features—things with visceral signi"cance to us, like other people’s pain, 
their deaths, love, compassion, trust, and betrayal—and their status in our 
practical thought.
Familiar forms of Kantian constructivism attempt to show that, in virtue 
of our capacity for practical reason alone, we are subject to a regimented 
moral law, furnishing in each case a determinate verdict. Our goal is more 
modest: to show that, in virtue of this capacity, we are answerable to the 
most essential and characteristically moral considerations—to other peo-
ple’s lives, pain, and well- being bearing on what we do. But this, too, would 
be an important success: to show that an appropriately minimal conception 
of the practical standpoint demands moral concern, that as soon as we have 
reasons, other people show up in them. We would have to sort out the tough 
cases amongst ourselves. But we’d escape what is, really, the deep threat of 
the idea of there being no universal moral order: people being free to treat 
us like we don’t matter at all.
(#e wren disappears into the brush.)
4.2 Outline
First, we’ll describe two dilemmas the constructivist faces. One is the famil-
iar dilemma between having an appropriately minimal conception of the 
practical standpoint and getting anything recognizably moral out of it, what 
we call the ‘stowaway dilemma.’ #e other is a dilemma between two kinds 
of alienation: the constructivist characteristically tries to avoid agents being 
alienated from their reasons by driving them inside the agent, as rooted in 
their own practical thought. But, we’ll argue, this risks alienating the agent 
from other people: other people showing up in the agent’s reasons only 
derivatively, without an appropriately directive voice of their own. We’ll 
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argue that these dilemmas recommend a picture of the practical standpoint 
prevalent in post- Kantian thought, where it is understood as somehow 
essentially social—in particular, as essentially requiring mutual recognition. 
We will develop one such picture, beginning with an account of mutual rec-
ognition as a pervasive feature of linguistic concepts, and culminating in 
what we call transformative expressivism.
4.3 Two dilemmas for the constructivist
4.3.1 Alienation
We navigate the world as a world of reasons, and we are reason- giving for 
each other: your su!ering is a reason for me to help. #is doesn’t depend on 
my happening to care, or deciding to be open to it, but on your pain being 
what it is—and what it is to you—and my being the kind of creature that 
can recognize its signi"cance. I’m accountable to you, and you to me, 
because of what we indelibly are.
But how? What makes your su!ering a reason for me, in the immediate, 
insistent way that it is? What makes me answerable to it, whether I want to 
be or not? Non- naturalist moral realism provides a straightforward answer 
but little explanation: because facts about the reasons generated by the suf-
fering of others are true. Normative reasons are part of the furniture of the 
universe, and one of them tells me to help you.@
#is raises questions. #e diversion through the deep facts of the uni-
verse seems to make your pain more distant from me than when it was in 
your voice. Non- natural reasons! What are these strange little things doing 
in our lives, with so central a role in our decisions about what to do? Are 
our lives, in so important a way as our ties to each other, really not a matter 
for us, but decided by the unthinking, unfeeling universe itself? How can 
these things written into the universe bind our practical thought, tell me 
what to value in a way I can’t escape? What ensures these are even things 
IAcan act for, that I even can know? For most realists, these questions border 
on nonsensical. It is simply the nature of reasons to be "t to enter our 
@ #e core of non- naturalist moral realism is that a complete ontology will make room for 
something normatively sui generis; see e.g. Shafer- Landau (2003), Par"t (2011), Enoch (2011), 
and Scanlon (2014). Naturalist realists take a di!erent approach, but ultimately fall into one 
version of this dilemma or another, for reasons we don’t have the space to discuss here. See 
(Samuel MS).
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deliberation. #is putatively additional property is in need of no more 
special explanation than their existence itself.
We want something more, and something more human. #is is 
Korsgaard’s central issue with realism. Traditional realism, she argues, leaves 
an explanatory gap: the existence of robust, mind- independent normative 
facts doesn’t explain why these things count as reasons for us. It’s just as 
though ‘we have normative concepts because we’ve spotted some normative 
entities, as it were wa:ing by’ (1996, 44).
We’ll call this concern normative alienation: an anxiety about the possi-
bility that we could have reasons to which we were motivationally indi!er-
ent, reasons whose relevance to our re9ective deliberation was at best 
coincidental, reasons of which we could be systematically unaware. If we 
were so alienated from normative facts, morality seems irrelevant, un"t to 
play the role in our lives that it evidently does.
Constructivists take seriously the task of explaining how normative 
 reasons are reasons for us, how they get their grip on us as agents. #ey 
begin by identifying a key characteristic or capacity of the kinds of creatures 
that are bound by normativity, and attempt to explain normative facts as 
somehow arising from it:
Normative concepts exist because human beings have normative prob-
lems. And we have normative problems because we are self- conscious 
rational animals, capable of re9ection about what we ought to believe and 
to do. (46)
Characteristically, these views hold that there are no normative facts inde-
pendently of the practical thought of the creatures subject to them: moral 
facts are somehow the product of the very capacity that makes creatures 
morally responsible. But driving the source of normativity inside the agent 
risks driving us apart from each other. In their e!ort to avoid normative 
alienation, we will argue, constructivists fall into what we’ll call ‘social 
alienation.’
Sharon Street’s (2008) Humean constructivism begins with the idea of a 
valuing creature: one that not only likes and dislikes, but also makes evalu-
ative judgments. Evaluative judgments, as opposed to mere evaluative atti-
tudes, are subject to the requirements of consistency and coherence. #e 
evaluative judgments that survive such scrutiny, or arise from it, are true, 
relativized to the agent’s particular practical point of view.
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If your su!ering is a reason for me, on Street’s view, it’s my attitudes that 
make it so. I might have started out valuing your well- being directly, or 
another of my initial values might have committed me to taking it up, for 
consistency and coherence’s sake. Likely, many things I value will be in ten-
sion with indi!erence to your well- being. But if your su!ering is a reason 
for me, it’s because of something personal about me, because my attitudes 
happened to commit me to wishing you well. Even if you and I do value 
each others’ well- being, we aren’t reason- giving to each other directly—our 
reasons come from our own attitudes, not from each other. We can’t, nor-
matively, really reach each other.
Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism begins with a conception of a re !ect-
ive agent: one that can endorse considerations as reasons and then act on 
their basis. Unlike Street’s valuing creature, the re9ective agent is supposed 
to be able to take re9ective distance from her own initial desires, to ask who 
she wants to be, to set ends independently of what she happens to desire.
Re9ective distance enables and requires us to decide what we will treat as 
a reason, and to have a basis for these decisions; we have to take up a ‘prac-
tical identity,’ a description under which we value ourselves. Taking some-
thing to be a reason, Korsgaard says, consists in adopting a certain maxim 
as a law governing my conduct, and we evaluate whether to do this under 
our practical identities: if the maxim is consistent with them, it’s a reason 
for us, and if it’s inconsistent, we are obligated otherwise, at the price of our 
identity.
One part of our identity, Korsgaard says, is inescapable. We have to value 
our humanity, Korsgaard says, if we are to value anything: that requires hav-
ing practical identities, and our need to have reasons to live is what sustains 
our practical identities. And valuing our own humanity, she says, means 
valuing the humanity of others—and that makes your pain a reason for me.
#e last step here is critical and opaque, and we will return to it. But for 
now, our focus is that this still seems to make your pain a reason for me in a 
way centered on myself.
To bring the worry into view, consider a similar concern that plagues 
perfectionist virtue ethics: that it turns morality into an exercise in self- 
improvement, that all of the normative force derives ultimately from the 
need to perfect oneself. As Wallace (2019, 46) puts it, ‘at the level at which 
normative requirements are explained, the interests of other people enter as 
occasions for the realization of virtue, rather than direct sources of require-
ments on the virtuous agent.’
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On Korsgaard’s picture, we might say, at the level at which normative 
requirements are explained, the interests of other people enter as stakes on 
which our identities may be sustained or torn, rather than themselves direct 
sources of requirements on us. All of our obligations come down to identity 
maintenance: ‘An obligation always takes the form of a rejection against a 
threat of a loss of identity,’ she says (1996, 102). Our accountability to others 
comes down to maintenance of the self.
We are supposed to be inescapably invested in the identity that generates 
our moral obligations; our concern for it isn’t frivolous. To violate it is to 
lose our identity, Korsgaard says, ‘to no longer be able to think of yourself 
under the description under which you value yourself and "nd your life to 
be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking’ (102). But it is 
about us.E It is almost as though the ultimate basis for your obligation not to 
harm others turned out to be that you would feel so guilty it would consume 
your life—that it would create an insurmountable problem for you, though 
in Korsgaard’s case, the problem is practical, not emotional.F It is not just as 
though we have added, to Street’s view, a sophisticated argument that we all 
actually do strongly desire the well- being of others. But it is not so far.
#e threat of normative alienation calls for a theory of normativity that 
brings it closer to us, into the messy, embodied, and perhaps contingent fea-
tures of our human lives. It pushes us toward ‘agent- centered’ theories, like 
constructivism: those that place the agent, the valuer, the reasoner at the 
center of their account of normative facts, emphasizing desires, values, pref-
erences, or the capacity to practically self- determine as foundational to the 
explanation of how there is normativity at all. But in bringing normativity 
closer to ourselves we risk losing our moral grip on one another. 
Constructivists, we have seen, take the threat of normative alienation ser-
ious ly, and fall into social alienation instead.
Korsgaard sees the importance of sociality. Her explanation of the key 
move between valuing one’s own humanity and valuing the humanity of 
others relies on the fact that reasons, she says, are ‘public in their very 
essence’ (1996, 135). But it’s not clear where that’s coming from. Is the fact 
that reasons are essentially public somehow a result of the nature of re 9ect-
ive agency itself? If so, she doesn’t show us how. If it’s a further fact about 
E Tarasenko- Struc (2019) similarly argues that, on Korsgaard’s account, all of our obliga-
tions to others are ultimately derivative of our obligations to ourselves.
F In her later work, the problem seems less practical and more of a threat to the meta -
physic al unity of the self (Korsgaard 2009).
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the nature of reasons, we seem to not be understanding reasons in terms of 
the nature of the capacity that generates them a:er all.
#is brings us to our second, more familiar dilemma.
4.3.2 Stowaway
#e constructivist’s idea is to make morality depend on us, but on some 
capacity pre- theoretically plausibly necessary for us to be subject to it. #ey 
o:en call this key capacity agency, but what is important is that it is a cap-
acity truly necessary for a creature to be morally bound. But this idea seems 
to resolve into a dilemma: From any appropriately thin theory of agency, it 
seems one cannot derive requirements thick enough to approximate moral-
ity. Any picture of agency thick enough to yield anything like morality looks 
like it has smuggled in something it isn’t entitled to.H
Street’s Humean constructivism falls on the thin horn: with consistency 
and coherence as the only regulating norms, agents are free to have a prac-
tical perspective from which they really ought to kill their husband, on 
account of their particular desires. It seems to give up morality to save 
the ought.
Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism seems to fall on the thick horn: the 
claims that reasons have to be universal and public don’t seem suIciently 
motivated, other than to get the moral result.J
#e particular problem with the thick horn will depend on what we want 
from our constructivism. It is o:en taken as coming in response to a stale-
mate between realism and antirealism, seeking to recover the objectivity of 
moral facts from the prevailing noncognitivism of the mid- twentieth cen-
tury, without running afoul of the naturalistic worries about traditional 
moral realism. If unconstructed moral norms have snuck in, they’ve brought 
who knows what metaphysical baggage.
If our main concern is responding to—of all people—the amoralist  skeptic 
asking why he should care about morality, we need a notion of agency that’s 
thin enough to be conceptually inescapable. #is is the heart of Enoch’s 
H #at something like this is a deep problem for Kantian constructivism is approaching con-
sensus; cf. Ti!any (2012) and Schafer (2015).
J Our pessimism re9ects what we take to be the general attitude of Korsgaard’s readers that 
one way or another the regress argument fails. See e.g. Cohen (1996), Bratman (1998), Gibbard 
(1999), Regan (2002), Ridge (2005).
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(2006) ‘shmagency’ objection: if we can cut the normativity- generating part 
away and still be le: with a practically functional capacity, the amoralist’s 
question about why he should care about being moral persists as a question 
about why he should care about being an agent rather than a ‘shmagent’—
like an agent but without the extra bit. If whatever is generating normativity 
isn’t actually a feature of everyone subject to morality, we haven’t bound 
everyone we should have.
We’re centrally looking for an explanation of why other people can give 
reasons to us. If sociality has been stuck at the end, we haven’t explained it.
4.4 A post- Kantian thought
To answer the stowaway dilemma, the constructivist needs to generate 
something recognizably moral from something she’s entitled to: from some-
thing genuinely inseparable from the core of the key capacity, from some-
thing not already moral, from something truly necessary to be bound by 
morality. To answer the alienation dilemma, our moral reasons need to be 
rooted inside the agent in the right way to not be normatively alienating, 
and yet somehow also ultimately focused outside the agent, on others.
We are deeply social animals! If we are going to "nd a source of norma-
tivity, a more basic kind of sociality is a compelling place to look. But, as 
Korsgaard notes, metaethicists have tended to treat this as an inappropriate 
basis for a vindicating account of morality, as though it would make it not 
really normative a:er all. If it were a contingent feature that wasn’t neces-
sary for us to be subject to morality’s demands, it wouldn’t give us an 
account that covered all the creatures it should.
In the post- Kantian tradition, there is a conception of agency that is 
intriguing here: agency as somehow essentially social. #is seems like exactly 
the kind of thing the alienation dilemma demands: it could allow us to drive 
morality into the agent, without severing it from others. And if sociality 
were in some way truly essential to agency, in a way that somehow demanded 
ongoing responsiveness to others, we could have a way between the stow-
away dilemma’s horns: other people could be the source of the char ac ter is-
tic al ly moral content, if our ability to evaluate and respond to reasons at all 
were somehow inseparable from their showing up in them.
Like the Kantian, the post- Kantian begins with our capacity for re9ective 
agency. But the post- Kantian holds that that capacity is not possible alone. 
Re9ective action requires self- consciousness, and self- consciousness is, 
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somehow, essentially social: for Fichte and Hegel, because it requires mutual 
recognition.L
We are recognizers: we are in the business of assigning signi"cances to 
things, classifying them in ways that practically guide us—as food, as sharp, 
fragile, dangerous, healthy, holy, etc. In doing so, we adopt a particular 
orien ta tion toward the object, manifested in how we treat, deliberate, and 
feel about it: we eat food, crave it when hungry; we avoid a dangerous thing 
when we can, or handle it with care, and might feel afraid around it.
We come to understand ourselves as recognizers by butting up against 
other recognizers: in more modern terms, we come to have theory of mind, 
the ability to understand our mental representations as our own, where 
other creatures’ or the world may di!er, by encountering those others.
Mutual recognition is something further. We don’t just independently 
each recognize the other as a creature who attributes signi"cances to things, 
in the way ravens might, trying to trick each other by pretending their 
caches are somewhere they’re not. In mutual recognition we classify each 
other as fellow recognizers, granting each other not just a signi"cance, but 
meta-signi"cance: as having a perspective that directly bears on the signi"-
cances we assign. Mutual recognition orients our minds to meet: we see 
each other as joint signi"cance attributors and arbiters, who recognize each 
other as such, and are co- constitutors and co- determiners of a shared con-
ceptual world.
On the post- Kantian picture, sharing a world awakens us to ourselves. It 
enables us to have reasons, instead of mere inclinations, to go beyond 
appearances, to judgments. We will develop a linguistic version of this claim.
4.5 Shared concepts
#e idea of granting each other any kind of authority in assigning signi"-
cances perhaps seems already moral. But it is mostly mundane. In fact, it 
seems like a pervasive part of language.
#e wren’s classi"cations are personal. #e behavior of other wrens might 
o!er evidence, but what signi"cances it assigns are ultimately a private mat-
ter. #ings changed for us, in coming to have language.
L #is discussion draws loosely from Fichte (1797) and Hegel (1807), "ltered through the 
interpretive work of Pinkard (1994), Brandom (2007,A2019), and Pippin (2008). See also Clarke 
(2009) and McNulty (2016).
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#e wren communicates with alarm calls, calling out to others when it 
senses danger and hiding away when other birds call. It might be oriented 
to make some adjustments to its underlying category according to the 
attunement of other birds’ alarms, to learn about dangers from them. But if 
it notices another little bird calls alarms in response to things that are stably 
outside the wren’s own category, that just means the other isn’t an especially 
reliable indicator of what concerns the wren—and things end there.
#at’s no way to get language o! the ground. Compare how we would 
respond: When you say something is dangerous that I really think is not, 
IAdon’t respond to you like I would respond to a robot trained to identify haz-
ards that has suddenly spit out a bizarre result. We are drawn to give  reasons, 
to explain our judgments. Some of these practices could be construed as 
just gathering information for ourselves, with more means than are avail-
able to the wren. But our concern outstrips that. If we don’t have di!erent 
background information, we still want to settle the issue: Can we distin-
guish a sense you’re using from the one we are? What standards are you 
using? What standards should we use? We treat each other as though we 
both have a kind of standing in how our shared concepts are assigned. We 
try to get on the same page.
#e birds’ communication isn’t conceptually generative; they have the 
categories they do and don’t seem to take on new ones for the sake of under-
standing each other.N But learning language involves taking on an enormous 
number of new ways of classifying things—it requires responding to the 
mere fact that others categorize things in a certain way by creating your 
own mental representation that does the same. Our linguistically mediated 
mental representations—what we’ll call concepts—are at their core tied to 
other people’s. Communicating with words requires sharing meanings, 
which requires coordinating concepts: we each have to maintain our own 
mental representation in such a way that they correspond, they ‘mean the 
same thing,’ are, somehow, ‘the same concept.’
Our concepts correspond centrally because they’re meant to. We under-
stand them as matching up with other people’s, and they’re programmed to 
make it work. We perhaps shouldn’t say that conceptual coordination 
strictly requires mutual recognition. #e universe is a big place; maybe 
some kind of creature can have a language that one of them is the queen of 
and all the rest "t their mental representations to hers. But the way we get 
N It is nevertheless better to be a bird!
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the requisite coordination, and do so organically, on our feet, is through 
mutual recognition: we treat each other as joint authors of our shared con-
cepts, in a deep and automatic way. It has to be deep, because our concepts 
have to be stuck together in a way more fundamental than any particular 
characterization if they are to be brought back into correspondence when 
they diverge. It has to extend beyond speakers of our own language, because 
the point is to come to speak the same one. It has to be largely automatic 
because of the sheer scale of coordination that needs to occur.
Our concepts are designed to function in a shared classi"catory and con-
ceptual project, and are structured in a way that is suitable for shared, not 
private, application: they don’t include things that couldn’t be included in 
other people’s as well, and they have application conditions that are in prin-
ciple sharable. ‘It bit me’ is an appropriate ground for the judgment that a 
creature bites insofar as I could be interchanged with any of us; ‘it bit me’, 
where special weight is given to the fact that it was me, is not.
We of course don’t have to accept the judgment of someone deploying a 
shared concept. But our use of them is naturally answerable to others:  others 
can challenge it, and in reply we need to account for our use in a way that 
they can, from their perspective, assess, using standards they could adopt 
themselves.
#is looks like the kind of deep but basic sociality that we might be able 
to build from: a generic kind of accountability to others, one bound up with 
our judgment.P
So far, of course, it doesn’t give us moral concern: what we’re a:er is other 
people being pushed to give standing to what really matters to us, not 
whether we think a hot dog is a sandwich. And it doesn’t give us re9ective 
agency: it might be bound up with re9ective judgments about concepts, but 
that in itself doesn’t give us any kind of control over our desires or ends.
But this would change if we had a lexicalizable concept such that giving 
standing to other people’s judgments about it constituted giving standing to 
what really matters to them; a concept such that applying it to something 
constituted setting that thing as an end.
In metaethics we have a view that posits something like that: expressivism.
#e proposal we o!er, a development of Peterson (MS), is expressivist in 
that evaluative judgments like ‘that’s good’ are construed as a matter of 
P Compare Korsgaard’s use of Wittgenstein’s ‘Private Language Argument’ (Sources §4.2.3). 
Our point here is more modest: regardless of whether a private language is possible, we can’t 
use one to communicate with each other. To do that, we have to coordinate.
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taking an a!ective and directive stance, not describing anything in the 
world. Unlike more familiar expressivist views, it takes the lexicalization of 
these a!ective signi"cances to be transformative: they become predicable 
concepts, and work in ways that their parent attitudes could not.Q
4.6 A human language
Some of our lexicalized concepts—passenger, prime—are categories only 
acquired through language in the "rst place. But others look like versions of 
pre- linguistic signi"cances: object, for example, appears to be a primitive 
kind of mental representation (CareyA2009); food looks like a pre- linguistic 
practical signi"cance orienting us to eat a thing when hungry; blue a phe-
nomenological visual signi"cance; sweet and bitter phenomenological and 
appetitive signi"cances; sad, disgusting, suspicious, exciting, surprising emo-
tive signi"cances.
Philosophers talk about ‘representation’ as though it must be represent-
ing things in the world, as they are in the world. But, of course, in the pre- 
theoretic sense of the term, the painting ‘Guernica’ represents the bombing 
of Guernica, not as it is to the universe, but as it is to us—or "rst to Picasso, 
and conveyed to us: as horrifying, as devastating, as incomprehensible, as a 
nightmare. It’s a representation in a human language, a conveying of vis-
ceral signi"cances things can have for us.
We can also convey human signi"cances with language: the phenomenal 
signi"cance of a thing being blue, the emotive signi"cance of a thing being 
sad. When we accept these judgments, we classify the thing under those 
signi"cances; we ‘see’ the thing as if it looked blue, or as if we felt sad 
about it.
On this account, these concepts, in the "rst instance, aren’t attempts to 
get at anything out in the world, but mental signi"cances that we share with 
each other.@R It’s a little odd to say that ‘the ocean is blue’ expresses blue phe-
nomenology. But it conveys it, records it, and presents things with it. If I tell 
Q We intend to use ‘transformative’ here in something like the sense in Boyle (2016), 
though not everything we say here is likely compatible with a transformative conception of 
rationality as he envisions it.
@R ‘Mental signi"cance’ isn’t meant to suggest a single uni"ed kind: it includes a wide variety 
of things, from plausible pre- linguistic mental categories, like food, to qualitative features that 
are not obviously pre- linguistically sortal, like color in visual experience. Food orients us to 
treat the thing in a speci"c way, color doesn’t have any intrinsic practical signi"cance. But both 
are ways that a thing can be consciously marked to us.
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you that alpine forget- me- nots are blue and in considering it you summon 
an experience somehow like the one you’d have if you were actually perceiv-
ing blue 9owers, you’ve understood me well.@@ #e signi"cance your blue 
concept has to you, and what you hope to convey to others in calling things 
blue, is this phenomenological content, not anything about wavelengths.@E 
#e signi"cance your sad concept has to you, and what you use it to convey, 
is an emotive content.
Non- linguistically, these signi"cances don’t manifest only in the hot, 
vivid renderings we feel in the "rst moment; we record them in cooler 
forms. #e lexicalized manifestations seem to look more like the latter. So 
accepting that something is blue in a linguistic mode doesn’t necessarily 
raise a sensation of blueness; accepting that something is sad or disgusting 
doesn’t necessarily raise a full- blown feeling of sadness or disgust—though 
it might. But it marks the object in the way sadness or disgust would: with 
an emotive signi"cance. It orients you to treat it in the way you’re oriented 
to treat things you’ve felt sad about or disgusted by.
#e lexicalization of these pre- linguistic signi"cances commits us to a 
particularly deep kind of mutual recognition. #e only sense in which we 
can share phenomenological and other psychological contents is by admit-
ting other people’s as corresponding: your color sensations, not just my 
own, have to be admitted as rendering the signi"cance—as characterizing 
the concept—for you to get a phenomenological grip on my claims about 
color. For each of us to have a concept that connects up to a pre- linguistic 
signi"cance in the right way, we have to treat those signi"cances, in each of 
our heads, as having the same fundamental relationship to the shared con-
cept. We can’t assign any phenomenological content to orange if you’ll only 
admit your visual experiences as bearing on it.
Pre- linguistically, these signi"cances are seemingly applied auto mat ic-
al ly, by characteristic faculties: things feeling cold, looking a certain shade, 
tasting sweet. To the wren, that’s it. It’s not obvious that the bird ever has 
occasion to evaluate competing color representations: With these signi"-
cances rendered only by its perceptual system, it’s never confronted with 
@@ #is is arguably Hobbes’ account of terms for ‘fancies’: privately, they function as ‘notes of 
remembrance’ that allow us to resurrect a decayed sense impression—see Leviathan iv.3, cf. ii.3 
and ii.10.
@E Not everyone we speak with does have access to the phenomenal content: blind and 
colorblind people can talk to color sighted people about color. #e concepts are held together 
by being meant to correspond, even when some speakers don’t have access to the phenomenal 
content that characterizes the concept for those that do.
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inconsistent representations of a single thing at a given time—the fact that a 
thing can’t simultaneously look both ways is what makes them inconsistent. 
And it’s not inconsistent for color phenomenology to change over time; the 
purple of the sky at dusk doesn’t compete with the gold of it in the morning. 
#e bird particularly doesn’t seem likely to develop any sense of its emotive 
signi"cances being mistaken. #ey’re just not the kind of thing that the 
world might push back on.
#ings change when the signi"cances are rendered into lexicalizable 
concepts—they change under mutual recognition. To play their communi-
cative role, the concepts have to be assignable in a di!erent way than the 
pre- linguistic signi"cances, and to things the pre- linguistic versions couldn’t 
reach: we have to be able to record things we have never ourselves seen or 
felt as cold and blue, on the basis of testimony. Truly competing signi"cance 
assignments become pervasive when we start sharing them with other 
re cog nizers. You saw something one way, I saw it another, and once we 
present those impressions under concepts that are supposed to correspond, 
we have an inconsistency, and a con9ict to negotiate.@F
#e concepts tell us to work it out. #e need is both interpersonal and 
internal. #e standing others’ non- linguistic impressions and conceptual 
assignments by necessity have on the shared concept means each of our rep-
resentations is called into question by the others’ report, even to ourselves: 
my concept to me is not just a matter of my own impressions, nor yours to 
you. How will we resolve the question? We have the automatic non- 
linguistic assignments to guide us, and the kind of meaning, and any prac-
tical import, the signi"cance has to us. But we need more: we start appealing 
to di!erent standards that others could apply as well, o!ering grounds for 
concept application that others could accept.
#e space made for these re9ective judgments is a space between us, and 
functions accordingly. As with other linguistic concepts, the standards we 
adopt have to be at least in principle sharable and subject neutral. #e fact 
that I was the one that saw or felt something of course tends to give it more 
grip, but my concept doesn’t itself prioritize me, because the concept builds 
itself to be shared.
Lexicalizable concepts don’t replace the corresponding pre- linguistic sig-
ni"cances, but they transform them: they change their status. A thing 
@F #is discussion picks up on a theme in Brandom’s ‘semantic’ reading of Hegel, according 
to which ‘determinate negation’ drives conceptual determinacy and re"nement. See especially 
1.IV and 3.II.
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marked to the wren with color phenomenology is not construed as either 
looking or being a color; the little bird is not called to make such distinc-
tions. But we are. Our non- linguistic mental faculties continue to mark 
things with the same signi"cances as always, no more on the basis of our 
conceptual standards than before. But if we re!ectively approach these clas-
si"cations, it’s in the form accessible to and suited for that kind of thought: 
the lexicalized, sharable concept, with interpersonally neutral standards for 
application. #e pre- linguistic signi"cances become re!ectively governed by 
interpersonally accessible standards, not exclusively attached on their basis. 
With our color concepts in hand, automatic color phenomenology becomes 
the ‘appearance’ of color, which may or may not be inscribed in the cor res-
pond ing conceptual color judgment.
#is is tantalizing. Lexicalization seems to enable us to take re9ective dis-
tance from signi"cances that were, pre- linguistically, automatically applied, 
by making them subject to mutual recognition—by giving other people 
standing. With emotive signi"cances like sad and joyful, we are reaching 
into the things we really care about. For our account of re9ective agency 
and moral concern, we need one more step: we need something more 
general.
4.7 Transformative expressivism
#e wren, now, has found a beetle to eat.
#e beetle being something the wren especially likes to eat appears, to 
the wren, just as the importance of the beetle simpliciter, not a signi"cance 
the beetle has only to it. Without much theory of mind, the wren can’t repre-
sent its desires and preferences as constrained to itself, with space held for 
other creatures’ perspectives to di!er. Its preferences are free to project out 
into the world, to appear like any other signi"cance a thing can have to the 
wren—as being another wren, another wren’s song, a place to nest, a stick 
suited to build, an egg to push out of the nest, a chick of its own, the way to 
9y when it gets cold.
Some of our attitudes—aversion, fear, grief, anger, dread—and sensations—
pain, nausea, breathlessness—are signi"cant to us in part by having nega-
tive valence. Other attitudes—desire, satisfaction, pride, a!ection—and 
sensations—comfort, rest for exhausted muscles, catching one’s breath—are 
signi"cant to us in part by having positive valence. #ese valences tend to 
project onto the associated object: the objects of our fear, grief, and anger 
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appear to us as having negative signi"cance; the objects of our desire, pride, 
and a!ection appear to us as having positive signi"cance. Negative valence 
orients us away or against; positive valence orients us toward and for.
#e wren likes some things and dislikes others, but without much aware-
ness of other minds; it doesn’t have a concept, or even a proto- concept, of 
evaluative attitudes. What it has, if anything, is a proto- concept of good: 
mental representations of things as positively and negatively valenced, as 
to- be- pursued and to- be- avoided, that don’t make any particular reference 
to itself. #e ‘language’ of the signi"cance is a!ective, the message is dir ect-
ive, and it’s about the object, not the wren. Representing attitudes as per-
sonal comes later: our beliefs in the "rst instance present themselves to us as 
about the world, representations we think of as our beliefs only if reason 
arises. Similarly, the world still appears to us with valence, valence we can, 
when appropriate, sequester as the issuance of our personal attitudes.
How could a proto- concept of ‘good’ like the wren’s—valences and dir-
ect ives issued by mere attitudes, marking up the world—become the full 
concept good? It is simple, and alchemy: in the same way any other mental 
signi"cance becomes a full, lexicalizable, concept, it gains a coordinative 
center of gravity.
#e normal workings of mutual recognition have special consequences 
here, because good and bad are special concepts: assigning good to some-
thing orients us toward it and for it, assigning bad to something orients us 
away from and against it. It’s a matter of taking a practical stance, of setting 
something as an end, and so re9ective control over it amounts to re9ective 
agency, and other people having standing on the question of what’s good 
amounts to their having standing on what we do.
Why would we have started doing that—letting other people in to in9u-
ence our desires, to draw our interests to their own? A!ective signi"cance is 
a central part of the natural meaning we experience in the world—and the 
meanings that matter most to us. It’s so nice to share them. It’s so nice to be 
and feel together. More temperately, it’s of course very useful. Our valenced 
experiences include the most urgent messages our bodies send us, and it’s 
good to be able to share them, and share the practical thrust before we have 
a precise explanation. #e valenced sensations we experience largely over-
lap, and in critically important ways: what tastes good and bad, for example, 
is largely recreational now, but a matter of life and death when we were in 
the business of eating unknown and imprecisely identi"ed things in the for-
est. As creatures that constantly spontaneously collaborate, it helps to be 
able to coordinate priorities and aims.
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What guides what we call good and bad? Like other lexicalized pre- linguistic 
signi"cances, three things: First, the spontaneous valenced attitudes that 
are its foundation. #e mental signi"cances unre9ectively projected by 
these attitudes become something like the ‘appearance’ of good and bad: 
provisional assignments we may or may not ultimately inscribe. Second, 
other applications of the lexicalized concept, the things we’ve already judged 
bad or good. With those two alone, we might have a tool to better sys tem-
atize our desires, to aIrm ones that "t together nicely and reject ones that 
undermine. But it wouldn’t enable us to measure a desire by anything but 
our others; it wouldn’t enable us to truly, from a perspective not controlled 
by our immediate inclinations, set our own ends. What allows us to take the 
actual distance characteristic of re9ective agency is the third thing: the 
way our lexicalizable concepts are built to be shared—to correspond to 
the concepts of others, so I can get, with words, a thought out of my head 
and into yours.
#ese criteria for application might seem to leave things too open. #e 
generic good and bad do leave things wide open. We can use good to 
describe the relief of a dying child’s pain, or an ice cream cone. It’s not 
surprising that people have developed many more speci"c evaluative 
vocabularies—in English, for example, duty, courage, right, and wrong—
with further constraints on their application. We will discuss them soon. 
But now, our focus is on our freewheeling, generic positive and negative 
evalu ations, that admit the exceptionally wide variety of things we can 
count as a reason.
And that demand we count certain things. Other people’s re9ectively 
endorsed ends bear directly on our own, because re9ectively endorsing an 
end is a matter of applying a shared concept that, like any other lexicalized 
concept, we by necessity understand as not personal, not a matter of our 
sole discretion, but corresponding and tied to others’, to be coordinatively 
applied.
As a concept rendering a pre- linguistic mental signi"cance, it also goes 
deeper: other people’s non- linguistic presentations of it also have to be 
admitted as bearing on the concept—as the ‘appearance’ of it—for it to have 
the right signi"cance to each of us. When the signi"cance at hand is valence, 
that means other people’s su!ering and despair appear as bad, and their joy, 
the relief of their pain, appear as good. You’re not forced to aIrm these 
‘appearances’ into judgments any more than you are with your own unre-
9ect ive valenced representations, though if denying that serious su!ering is 
itself bad is conceptually possible, it is just barely: the way real su!ering 
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presents itself to the su!erer—the overwhelming, inescapable negative 
feeling, the desperation to escape—is a paradigm of what, at its extreme, bad 
means to us, of the kind of signi"cance we, in drier moments, use the con-
cept to evoke.@H But most importantly, other people’s valenced feelings and 
sensations relate to the shared concept in the same way and with the same 
essential standing as your own. You can’t admit your pain as characterizing 
what’s bad and deny that others’ does, just because they’re not you, any 
more than you could admit your own color experiences as characterizing 
orange and deny that anyone else’s do. Your reasons for rejecting the appar-
ent badness of someone else’s su!ering have to be interpersonally available: 
they can’t prioritize you for the sake of being you.
Re9ective agency requires being able to take an evaluative perspective 
somehow external to your own desires. As far as we can tell, the universe’s 
standpoint is one of hydrogen, helium, and rocks—a standpoint poorly 
suited for these purposes. Even if the universe somehow has a normative 
perspective, it won’t help us gain the capacity necessary for re9ective agency, 
because it’s not forthcoming. Instead, we "nd re9ective distance in the space 
between us: in coming to be inclined and able to consider other a!ective 
perspectives, without being obligated to accept any particular judgment; to 
be able to re9ectively grant things we don’t spontaneously desire this status 
on the basis of the kind of reasons that could motivate such a desire; to hear 
others’ responses to the values we have; to develop them, together, where 
they accord.
Our re9ections happen in this shared space, but our judgments are ul tim-
ate ly our own. We can build, gradually, a foundation of values we’ve re 9ect-
ively chosen, that were considered not just in light of our other immediate 
inclinations, but on the kind of considerations that might move many of us.
4.7.1 Dilemmas
We were a:er a social constructivism, in hopes that it would provide a way 
out of our dilemmas. #e transformative expressivist proposal does well.
It’s not normatively alienating, because moral reasons are raised within 
the agent’s own capacity for re9ective deliberation. It’s not socially alienat-
ing, because we have standing in each other’s practical deliberations directly, 
@H Cf. Manne (2017), for whom certain bodily states constitute moral claims directed at any 
creature close enough to notice.
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as fellow recognizers: other people’s pain bears directly on the most basic 
concepts, good and bad, we use to set our ends. #e signi"cance your pain 
has to you is what makes it a reason for me, given my being a creature that 
can recognize it.
#e account is entitled to its resources twice over. First, the sociality it 
appeals to is not already moral, because it is taken to be a feature of all lexi-
calizable concepts: you have to be social about itchy and potato in the same 
way. Second, it gives a genealogy on which the very feature that makes you 
reason- giving for me is also the foundation of re9ective agency: I get re 9ect ive 
distance from myself by becoming open to other people. #ey are inseparable.
And it gets a recognizably moral result: not a full moral law, but moral 
concern. Other people have standing with regard to what we re9ectively 
take as our ends. #eir su!ering presents itself as a reason against, and in 
my re9ective deliberation, I am pushed to give it the standing of my own.
#is is, of course, not a story of how we all became good. It is a story of 
how other people got into our reasons, by default and from the start. It’s a 
story of how we became accountable to other people’s pain, how the justi"-
catory burden for disregarding it is legitimate and high.
#e concept is not itself inconsistent with oppressive or genocidal ideolo-
gies that devalue some kinds of people: it demands interpersonally ac cess-
ible reasons for treating people di!erently, but can’t itself ensure the beliefs 
people take up are good or decent.
#e account validates our moral appeals but does not provide any new 
arguments with which to convince the amoralist, which seems just as well. 
#e appropriate response to someone declaring that they don’t intend to 
treat others as though their lives and well- being amount to anything is to 
get ready to "ght them, not debate them, and certainly not to base our  ethics 
around them. Debate will never be an e!ective response to people who 
don’t care to treat others decently, and metaethics can’t protect us from 
cruel ty and cold disregard. We have to protect each other.
4.7.2 Normative gardens
What the nature of our practical thought gives us isn’t a determinate moral 
law, but moral concern, and an opportunity: the ability and readiness to 
build, together, rich normative worlds that grip us and that bring meaning 
to our lives. In addition to lexicalizing pre- linguistic, generic positive and 
negative evaluations, language enables us to develop novel evaluative 
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concepts together, wrapping the a!ective and directive force of the generic 
good and bad into more complex wholes, all with the social features of lin-
guis tic al ly mediated concepts that drive us together in conception. We can 
build normative and a!ective worlds, and we are proli"c. We can imbue 
negative evaluation into concepts picking out speci"c kinds of action, like 
murder or kinkshaming or—especially forcefully—people who perform 
those actions, like rapist or scab. We can develop concepts that constrain 
how we evaluate: right and wrong, for example, seem to ask for a rational, 
principled justi"cation; some modes of evaluation like e"cient, productive, 
and strategic cleanly excise evaluation of the goal from evaluation of the action. 
Rather than living under a tidy, singular moral order, we "nd ourselves in 
an over9owing garden of normative concepts.
#e generic a!ective content by default grips us wherever it’s imbued, but 
unlike good and bad, these more particular concepts aren’t cognitively 
in escap able. Which we habitually use has practical consequences: di!erent 
concepts with di!erent application conditions will lead us to imbue di!er-
ent features with their motivational force. #e push we feel to rescind right 
and wrong judgments when it looks like we won’t be able to o!er a rational, 
completely generalizable defense of them does not extend to fucked up or 
not ok judgments; we will relinquish the former in situations where we 
could maintain the latter with full motivational force.
Other people’s su!ering is not a paradigmatic instance of all of these 
more complex concepts. In addition, evaluative concepts with additional 
content don’t all share the evaluative egalitarianism that the collaborative 
demands of shared concepts generate in a concept, like red or good, whose 
essential content is just a fundamental way things ‘appear’ to each of us. #e 
fact that we are pulled to coordinate on judgments about what is sinful, just 
not done, or insubordinate doesn’t give each of us this kind of ‘equal say,’ 
because the concepts are in their content oriented toward particular sources 
of authority: God, established convention, hierarchy.
4.8 Real alienation
All this raises the specter of a "nal genre of alienation, what we’ll call real 
alienation.
#ere are both normative and social varieties. Real normative alienation 
arises when a person experiences the normative framework within which 
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they exercise their agency as alien, as not their own, incapable of being their 
own. It can arise when, because of our cultural context, we habitually use 
evaluative concepts that involve content we don’t, or wouldn’t, endorse: for 
example, we might not identify with a hegemonic mode of practical evalu-
ation but give it a central action guiding role in our thought in a defensive 
way, because we expect others will evaluate us in its culturally dominant 
terms. Or we might use an inherited concept without scrutinizing its 
content.
Real social alienation can arise when you habitually use only modes of 
practical evaluation that don’t connect you to others in the right way. If by 
default you only evaluate your actions for whether they’re e"cient (or 
ad mir able), you’re not, in your actual practical thought, connecting to 
 others, even though you have other—more primitive, inescapable but 
neglected—concepts that would.
Importantly, this "nal kind of alienation is not a feature of the metaethi-
cal theory, but a troubling feature of life it does not explain away. #e pic-
ture we’ve provided can make sense of radical criticism—though it might be 
diIcult to make, and to have heard, under certain hegemonic frameworks. 
But metaethics can’t prevent us from being entangled in evaluative frame-
works that are disenfranchising, oppressive, or otherwise inhospitable to 
our lives. What we can ask of theory is to equip us with resources that might 
help us identify and resist it.
In acquiring one’s conception of the world one always belongs to a par-
ticular grouping which is that of all the social elements which share the 
same mode of thinking or acting. When one’s conception of the world is 
not critical and coherent but disjointed and episodic, one belongs sim ul-
tan eous ly to a multiplicity of mass human groups. #e personality is 
strangely composite: it contains Stone Age elements and principles of a 
more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the 
local level and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of a 
human race united all over.A.A. . #e starting point of critical elaboration is 
the consciousness of what one really is, and is “knowing thyself ” as a 
product of the historical process to date which has deposited in you an 
in"nity of traces, without leaving an inventory. (Antonio Gramsci, 
Selections from Prison Notebooks)
#e wren sings a song it seems to have learned from its neighbor.
Shoemaker_9780192844644_4.INDD   101 3/26/2021   4:19:54 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 26/03/21, SPi
Dictionary: NOSD
OM% &'()*+, -.+.(*/0 ,01 2,34 5,67.8
References
Boyle, Matthew. 2016. ‘Additive #eories of Rationality: A Critique.’European 
Journal of Philosophy 24 (3): 527–55.
Brandom, Robert. 2007. ‘#e Structure of Desire and Recognition: Self-
Consciousness and Self-Constitution.’ Philosophy and Social Criticism 
33A(1): 127–50.
Brandom, Robert. 2019. A Spirit of Trust. Harvard University Press.
Bratman, Michael. 1998. ‘Review of Korsgaard’s #e Sources of Normativity.’ 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 699–709.
Carey, Susan. 2009. #e Origin of Concepts. Oxford University Press.
Clarke, James Alexander. 2009. ‘Fichte and Hegel on Recognition.’ British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (2): 365–85.
Cohen, G.A. 1996. ‘Reason, Humanity, and the Moral Law,’ in Christine 
Korsgaard, ed., #e Sources of Normativity, pp. 167–88. Cambridge 
University Press.
Enoch, David. 2006. ‘Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from 
What Is Constitutive of Action.’ Philosophical Review 115 (2): 169–98.
Enoch, David. 2011. Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. 
Oxford University Press.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. 1797. Grundlagen Des Naturrechts Nach Prinzipien 
Der Wissenscha:slehre. C.E.AGabler.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1807. Phänomenologie Des Geistes. Würzburg.
Gibbard, Allan. 1999. ‘Morality as Consistency in Living: Korsgaard’s Kantian 
Lectures.’ Ethics 110 (1): 140–64.
Korsgaard, Christine, ed. 1996. #e Sources of Normativity. Cambridge 
University Press.
Korsgaard, Christine. 2009. Self-Constitution. Oxford University Press.
McNulty, Jacob. 2016. ‘Transcendental Philosophy and Intersubjectivity: Mutual 
Recognition as a Condition for the Possibility of Self-Consciousness in 
Sections 1–3 of Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right.’ European Journal of 
Philosophy 24 (4): 788–810.
Manne, Kate. 2017. ‘Locating Morality: Moral Imperatives as Bodily 
Imperatives,’ in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12, 
chapter 1. Oxford University Press.
Par"t, Derek. 2011. On What Matters: Volume Two. Oxford University Press.
Peterson, Christa. MS. Dissertation in progress. University of Southern California.
Shoemaker_9780192844644_4.INDD   102 3/26/2021   4:19:54 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FIRST PROOF, 26/03/21, SPi
Dictionary: NOSD
;'. <)='+ ,01 +'. >(.0 OM?
Pinkard, TerryA P. 1994. Hegel’s Phenomenology: #e Sociality of Reason. 
Cambridge University Press.
Pippin, Robert. 2008. Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical 
Life. Cambridge University Press.
Regan, DonaldAH. 2002. ‘#e Value of Rational Nature.’ Ethics 112 (2): 267–91.
Ridge, Michael. 2005. ‘Why Must We #reat Humanity with Respect? Evaluating 
the Regress Argument.’ European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1): 57–73.
Samuel, Jack. MS. ‘Alienation and the Metaphysics of Normativity: On the 
Quality of Our Relations with the World.’
Scanlon, #omas. 2014. Being Realistic About Reasons. Oxford University Press.
Schafer, Karl. 2015. ‘Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics: 
Realism and Constructivism in a Kantian Context.’ Philosophy Compass 
10A(10): 690–701.
Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.
Street, Sharon. 2008. ‘Constructivism about Reasons,’ in Russ Shafer-Landau, 
ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3, chapter 8. Oxford University Press.
Tarasenko-Struc, Aleksy. 2019. ‘Kantian Constructivism and the Authority of 
Others.’ European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1): 77–92.
Ti!any, Evan. 2012. ‘Why Be an Agent?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 
(2): 223–33.
Wallace, Jay. 2019. #e Moral Nexus. Princeton University Press.
Shoemaker_9780192844644_4.INDD   103 3/26/2021   4:19:54 PM
